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Abstract: This article makes two points. First, it argues that sociology, like all knowledge, is shaped,
though not determined, by its historical-cultural origins. Early sociology arose in 19th-century Europe
and its core concepts were shaped by that era—both in what they reveal about society and what they
hide. We now realize this, so we sociologists of religion need to examine our inherited concepts to
understand those concepts’ limitations. We also need to include an analysis of the way the current
historical-cultural situation shapes sociology today. This is the theoretical reflexivity called for in
the title. Second, the article argues that expanding sociology’s conceptual canon to include insights
from other historical-cultural locations is more than just an ethical matter. It is also epistemological.
Sociology does not make progress unless it includes insights from as many standpoints as possible.
This does not mean that all insights are equal. It does mean that all have the potential to improve
sociological understanding. Whether or not they actually do so is a matter for the scientific process
to decide.
Keywords: sociology of religion; post-colonial; reflexivity; epistemology
1. Introduction
Let me explain my title. Sociology as an intellectual discipline was born in late 19th and early
20th century Europe as an attempt to explain the rapid social changes of that era (Giddens 1976;
Al-Hardan 2018). Comte, Marx, Spencer, Tönnies, Durkheim, Weber, and the rest had different
theories about why and how that change was occurring, but they all thought that something new was
afoot in the world. Europe was for them the leading edge of this process. They saw science in general
and social science in particular as ways of understanding this new world and of bringing it more
fully under human control. They sought to understand the ways that societies shape people: their
lives, their actions, and their ideas. Theirs was an Enlightenment project: they believed that scientific
knowledge would improve human lives. Weber, more than others, had doubts about this outcome, but
all of them thought that the effort was worthwhile.
There was one epistemological problem. Excepting Marx, these early sociologists forgot to locate
themselves in the landscape they were describing, and even Marx did not do so consistently. They
forgot that they, too, were historical beings, whose social surroundings shape their thinking. Douglas
(1975, p. xii) comment that, for Durkheim, the social shaping of knowledge “applied fully to them, the
primitives, and only partially to us” was true for all of sociology’s founders. Theirs was a colonial world
and they stood on top of it, imagining that their superior perspective gave them special responsibility
for the well-being of the people they were studying. Their concepts and theories were shaped by their
colonial situation. They ignored earlier sociologies, such as that of the great Arab scholar Ibn Khaldūn,
because they mistakenly thought that he did not speak to the world’s current condition (Spickard
2017a, pp. 135–79). And they suppressed the work of non-White sociologists, such as W. E. B. Du Bois,
because that work threatened White Euro-American intellectual hegemony (Morris 2017).
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We no longer tolerate living in that world. Colonialism is dead (though its aftereffects live on),
neither Europe nor America is the sole source of intellectual vision, and the Enlightenment project
is in tatters. Sociologists who were raised in my White, male, Euro-American, post-Christian,
professional-class intellectual milieu have no special insights just because we have mastered sociology’s
inherited intellectual discourse. We do have insights, but we cannot assume that they are better or
more useful than the insights gained from people shaped by other social locations: countries, races,
ethnicities, classes, genders, sexualities, religions, and so on. Sociologists raised in these other locales
can often see things that people raised like me cannot. Their ideas, however, have also been shaped
by their social settings. Some of their concepts and theories, though not all, will improve sociology’s
ability to understand the complex social world in which we now live. So, I hope, will some of mine.
That is the first point of this article: all knowledge—including sociology—is shaped, though not
determined, by the history and culture within which it arose. I explore the consequences of this for
the sociology of religion, drawing a parallel with the revolution that has reshaped anthropological
ethnography over the last three decades. Ethnographers have learned that they need to include
themselves in the social landscape, if they are to represent it accurately. I argue that such descriptive
reflexivity needs to be supplemented by a theoretical reflexivity. Sociologists must acknowledge that
our standard concepts and theories were produced in a particular historical-cultural milieu. Only by
understanding the limitations that the milieu built into those concepts can we improve them and make
social-scientific progress.
The second point is related to this, but on an epistemological level. There is a good deal of
effort among sociologists to expand the sociological canon on ethical grounds (Al-Hardan 2018).
International Sociological Association President Margaret Abraham (2018) address at the latest World
Congress of Sociology is a fine example of this, as were many other speeches and commentaries at
the event. I shall make a different argument: that the demand for expansion is epistemological just
as much as it is ethical. Sociology needs to include diverse voices in order create better knowledge.
To remain scientific, we sociologists must transcend our discipline’s Euro-American origins. We must
embrace theoretical resources from many other standpoints, if we are to improve our understanding of
our now-shared world.
2. Religion and Sociology’s Origins
Let us start with the situation in which the early sociologists created our discipline. They were
trying to explain processes that centered on their own societies and they were trying to establish a
discipline that saw the world in a new, scientific way. Like all intellectual revolutionaries, they had
to distinguish their explanations from competing ideas. Especially in 19th-century France, but also
elsewhere, this meant opposing religious understandings of the situation with sociological ones.
This involved more than just Comte (1853) postulated progression from theology to metaphysics to
science. Reactionary Catholicism worked hard to undermine the French secular state and especially the
Third Republic. In response, progressive sociologists treated religion as sociology’s conceptual ‘Other’
(Vásquez 2013). Sociology saw itself as the voice of the future: clear, rational, enlightened, and scientific.
This cast religion as a holdover from the past. In the founder’s minds, science would ascend while
irrational, authoritarian, credulous religion would fade away. The result, Vásquez argued—as did
Martin (2005, p. 17) before him—was that secularization theory was built into sociology from the very
beginning. The notion that religion is vanishing is a myth, but a powerful one, even now.
I have elsewhere described this myth as part of sociology’s “default view” (Spickard 2017a,
pp. 21–34). This is a set of taken-for-granted presumptions about religion that shape our scholarship
without fully entering our awareness. It includes such notions as religions being primarily matters
of belief, embodied in formal organizations, headed by people analogous to clergy, having sacred
texts, and so on (Beyer 2006). Sociologists of religion no longer adhere to this as strictly as they did
even ten years ago, though the view remains strong, particularly (but not exclusively) in the United
States and among quantitative researchers (Smilde and May 2010). Textbooks still uphold the default
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view (Spickard 1994; 2017a, pp. 22–25). Mainstream theory has not significantly departed from the
old pattern (Bender et al. 2013), though it is being chewed around the edges by feminists (Neitz 2000;
Goldman 2012), scholars of “lived religion” (Hall 1997; Ammerman 2007; McGuire 2008), those
investigating religion in ‘non-religious’ places (Bender 2003; Cadge 2013; Gauthier 2013), and Latin
American advocates of “popular religion” as the road to understanding religion’s future (Parker 1996,
2018; de la Torre and Martín 2016).
That is why I wrote Alternative Sociologies of Religion (2017a). In it, I discussed the limitations of this
default view, but I also presented three non-Western alternatives. If sociology had started in Confucian
China, for example, it would have seen the sacred as a relational rather than as an organizational
matter. Confucian sociologists of religion would ask a question seldom previously considered in the
subdiscipline: Who maintains the sacred relationships in a given instance of religious life? In my book,
I show that, for American religious congregations, this is done by the women cooking the church
suppers and tending to members’ needs (Spickard 2017a, pp. 111–34). This realization puts women
at the center of congregational life and men on the periphery—a conclusion that empirical evidence
supports as well (Marler 2008; O’Brien 2012; Day 2017). This is the reverse of the Euro-American
default view.
I did something similar for sociologies built on the work of Ibn Khaldūn and on insights drawn
from Navajo ceremonialism. Ibn Khaldūn explored the ways in which religion and ethnicity both
generate “group-feeling”, while traditional Navajo religion emphasizes the importance of ritual
experiences unfolding in time. These approaches are not special; they just happened to be the ones
that I know something about. But the point is special: other historical-cultural situations generate
other default views of religion. Each of these default views highlights something different about our
subject matter. We learn something important by learning to see religion from other historical-cultural
vantage points. It is only by recognizing the limitations of the standard way of thinking and learning
to see from other standpoints that we make scientific progress.
The point, again, is that all knowledge, including ours, is shaped by its historical-cultural location.
As theorists, we need to become aware of this, to avoid the errors of the past. I spent some time in
the book showing how sociology’s 19th-century origins primed it to embrace secularization theory.
I also showed a connection between market-oriented rational choice theory and the 1980s and 1990s
intellectual zeitgeist that saw markets as good explanations for almost everything and saw individual
choice as constituent of all aspects of life. I won’t go into these here.
Instead, I want to explore a deeper issue. I want to explore the necessity of and the implications of
sociologists of religion taking our own historical-cultural locations into account in our theorizing—from
non-dominant locations as much as from dominant ones. Why do we need to remember where we
stand when we survey the social world? Why should we focus on how that standpoint shapes our
thinking? What can we gain from building that realization into our theories?
I am speaking, here, of a theoretical parallel to the revolution that has reshaped anthropological
ethnography over the last three decades (Clifford and Marcus 1986; Behar and Gordon 1995;
Dawson et al. 1997; Spickard et al. 2002). Ethnographers used to present themselves as having a
God’s-eye view of the social scenes they were describing, but they no longer do so. They have long
acknowledged that their data come from their ability to embed themselves in scenes that are not their
own, but they now acknowledge the need to make explicit what their own backgrounds prevent them
from seeing. They need to show their readers how the ideas they bring with them into the field often
prevent them from understanding aspects of the scenes they are trying to portray.
The young Isaac Newton wrote in his notebooks about sticking a large needle in his eye, to learn
how that eye systematically distorted his vision (Breen 2014). I am not asking us to do anything so
painful. Yet learning to see the limits of our own seeing is crucial for making progress as a field.
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3. The Ethnographic Revolution
What was this ethnographic revolution? How is what anthropological ethnographers do today
different from what they did when I was trained a couple of generations ago?
My teachers and my teachers’ teachers were trained to visit far-away peoples, learn their
languages, find out how they saw the world, how they acted in it, and how they maintained a sense of
meaning. Then they were supposed to report back to their readers or superiors about what they learned.
The results are fascinating. Books like Argonauts of the Western Pacific (Malinowski 1922), We, the Tikopia
(Firth 1936), Nuer Religion (Evans-Pritchard 1956), Divinity and Experience (Lienhardt 1961), Navaho
Witchcraft (Kluckholn 1944) and others carry us to unaccustomed worlds. These were good books,
but they were embedded in a colonial power structure that remained hidden from their readers’ view
(Wolf 1982). Evans-Pritchard, for example, was sent to the Sudan by the British Colonial Office to find
out about Nuer politics. He so mastered their segmentary political system that he organized Nuer
raids against Italians troops in neighboring Ethiopia in early World War II (Geertz 1988). Yet he did
not write about that success. Instead, he wrote about the Nuer as if he were invisible, a fly on the wall,
not really there.
A few decades prior, the American ethnographer Frank Cushing installed himself without
permission in the Governor’s living-room at Zuni Pueblo and wandered into secret ceremonies
uninvited (McFeely 2001). The Zuni did not want to risk annoying his employers at the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, so they did not throw him out. They turned the tables, however, by sending their
own ethnographer to Washington DC to figure out how to keep the Americans at bay. We’wha,
a cross-dressing berdache, was fêted for a year as a “Zuni princess”. We don’t know what secrets she
took back to New Mexico with her, but they surely helped the Zuni maintain some independence.
Most, though not all, of these early ethnographers retained a colonial outlook on the people
they were observing. They thought that “We”, the advanced people, study “Them”, the backward
people, either to control them or to save their knowledge for posterity as their cultures fade
away. Sociological ethnography began slightly differently. In the U.S., the Chicago School and
the Settlement House movement were projects of an educated elite who used ethnography to study
immigrants and lower class people whom the elite wanted to teach middle-class American behavior
(Thomas and Znaniecki 1996; Whyte 1943).
Contemporary sociology of religion has inherited this approach. Our typical ethnographies try to
show what role religion plays in lower-status people’s lives. Think about the way that our discipline
frames theories: if the tables were turned, would we be claiming that the elite’s religions are mere
“compensators” for the things they can’t have in life (Stark and Bainbridge 1980)? Yet we entertain this
about poor and working-class people’s religions, and ethnic minorities’, too. Too many of our studies
still explain such religion as “the sigh of the oppressed creature” (Marx 1844). Few of us would accept
this conclusion, were lower-status people to investigate us.
Such dynamics operate across all the lines dividing our increasingly globalized society: class,
race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, level of development, education, place in the world colonial and
neo-colonial system, and so on. Scholars of all stripes need to understand our own position in these
systems at least as much as Newton had to understand how his eye bent light. If we don’t know the
distortions, we cannot correct for them. We cannot really see the world we are investigating.
Such thinking brought forth “the reflexive turn” in contemporary ethnography. A host of new
ethnographers wrote themselves into their stories, so we could better understand their fieldwork and
grasp the dynamics of the social scenes they were recording (Hamabata 1990; Behar 1996). Brown (1991,
2002), for example, wrote herself into her ethnographic biography of Alourdes, a Vodou priestess living
in Brooklyn, New York. Brown used her presence to highlight her own cultural missteps and to remind
readers that Alourdes was the expert on Vodou, not she. Tweed (1997, 2002) wrote of his ambivalent
experiences investigating a Cuban-American Marian shrine in Miami. His natal (but abandoned)
Catholicism gave him access to the shrine keepers, but it also led them to try to reconvert him. This
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challenged him as a scholar. It made him realize that the people we study have agendas, too. He told
us about this, so we, his readers, would know the limits of his seeing.
We need to know such things, and not just because they remind us that ethnography is a very
personal data-gathering method. They also remind us that we, as readers, bring our historical-cultural
prejudices to the texts. We can misread those texts, destructively. Heelas and Woodhead (2005) and
Albrow (1997) have each written about American culture’s fascination with Pentecostal snake-handling,
which many observers see as dark, mysterious, benighted, and cruel. Both these scholars show how
this image of Pentecostal mountain people says more about educated people’s voyeuristic fantasies
than it does about the ‘snake-handlers’ themselves.
That’s the point. Each of us brings our own historical and cultural assumptions to our investigations.
If we are unaware of them, they will color our findings. We will, as do so many sociologists of religion,
look for religion in churches, synagogues, mosques, temples, gurdwaras, and other formal places
and ignore it everywhere else. We will ask people about their religious beliefs but not about their
relationships. We will ask them how religions shape their moral lives. These are all good questions,
but they retain a partial vision of religious life.
We can no longer treat Euro-American Christianity as the model by which we understand all
religions. We live in a different world than did our sociological forebears. We need to explore it—and
theorize about it—differently than we have before.
4. Our Present Situation
What is our historical-cultural situation? It is not that of late 19th-century France, nor that
of mid-20th-century America, though both still heavily influence our thinking. What does our
contemporary situation prime us to see about religion that we might not have seen before? Three
factors stand out to me, though there may well be others.
The first of these is globalization. Where once our lives revolved around our local communities
and most of us produced goods and services for the local market, now we have ties to people around the
world. These ties involve much more than the ubiquity of telephones and of the Internet. They involve
more than the complex network of trade relations that bring bananas, coffee, and tea to our breakfast
tables. They even involve more than the interconnected financial markets that, on the one hand, let
us use our credit cards in Timbuktu but, on the other hand, produce worldwide financial panics that
threaten to bring whole economies to their knees.1 All these are important, but they do not exhaust the
connections we now have with one another.
The fact is, our current global system is shaped by great inequality, specifically by the aftermath
of centuries of Euro-American colonialism. Europe and North America, plus Japan, China, Australia,
and a few others, have much more influence than do most places. This makes every intellectual act
different than would be the case if these power relations did not exist. Those of us who live in the
metropole can theorize as if the world were “flat”, to use Friedman (2006) rather ideological metaphor.
Those theorizing from other places cannot ignore the metaphoric hills and mountains that perpetuate
social inequality (de Blij 2009). Opportunity is decidedly not available to everyone. Power divides us
wherever we turn.
For scholars, some of those hills and mountains come from differential access to research funding.
May and Smilde (2018) recently sampled forty years of articles on religion in top U.S. sociology journals
and found that an increasing percentage depended on funding, especially from non-public sources.
This makes it difficult for scholars from outside the metropole to publish in such journals, as they
lack the right financial connections. As a result, scholars from the Global North dominate sociological
research and those from the Global South are ignored. To take one small example, sociologists around
1 Think of the worldwide market-quakes radiating from Mexico (1994), East Asia (1997), Russia (1998), the U.S. (tech stocks in
2001; hedge funds in 2005; sub-prime mortgages in 2007–2008), and Europe (PIIGS debt crisis 2009–2013).
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the world are familiar with North American scholars who have written on Latin American popular
religion, such as Smith (1996) and Ammerman (2007), but are far less familiar with the many Latin
American scholars who have done so too (Antoniazzi et al. 1994; Mariz and das Dores Campos
Machado 1998; López 2000; de Carlos 2004; Orellana 2008; Mansilla 2009).
People today are thus both linked and divided. Our different historical-cultural locations make us
see these links and divisions differently. We cannot understand religion’s place in the world without
reaching beyond our own standpoints.
A second crucial factor is identity. Identities come in different varieties than they used to. I wrote
in my book that
Only men have the privilege of imagining that they lack gender. Only Whites have the
privilege of imagining that they lack race. [And] only heterosexuals have the privilege of
ignoring peoples’ varied and complex sexualities. (Spickard 2017a, p. 247)
Let me add that only people who live in relative wealth can imagine that poverty does not matter.
Only people who live in stable nations can imagine that there are still fixed and safe nationalities.
Only people who have the freedom to choose their religions can imagine that religion is a matter of
private choice.
These identities are not mutually exclusive. The term ‘intersectionality’ underlines the fact that
the various forms of social stratification I have just listed do not exist separately from each other but are
interwoven in real people’s lives (McCall 2005). This makes the investigation of conceptual blinders an
empirical matter. For example, I have a colleague who looks a lot like me, but you cannot understand
the way he thinks unless you know that he went to school in an African American neighborhood and
attended an Asian evangelical church for over 30 years. His historical-cultural background is different
than his attributed identity would seem.
Today, however, any of these attributed identities can become a master identity, even against
a person’s will. The Croatian writer Drakulić (1993) described how she had always defined herself
by her education, profession, gender, and personality—until the Croatian-Serbian war stripped her
of everything but being a Croat. Religion can do the same thing; think of the 1975–1990 civil war in
Lebanon, the recent rise of ISIS in the Middle East, and anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar and Germany
today. Identity is a key factor in our current world, but it is imposed as often as it is freely chosen.
If our theories cannot see this, then we are standing in the wrong place.
If our theories forget to think about the complexities of genders, races, sexualities, class standings,
nationalisms, and different peoples’ abilities to choose—along with their intersections—then we are
forgetting the real world that we live in. Theories about a fanciful world are just that: fantasies. This is
not good enough.
Yet there is a third factor, as well. I had originally subtitled my book “Towards a World-Conscious
Sociology of Religion” because I think we are on the cusp of an era in which consciousness of the
world as a single place is possible. This is not some Pollyannaish moment, filled with sparkly My Little
Ponies and everyone singing Kumbaya. (I apologize for the Americanisms, but they express this very
well). Nor is it because we have that famous picture of a blue planet hanging in the starry firmament
(Apollo 1968) and French President Macron reminding the U.S. Congress that “We have no Planet B”
(CNN 2018).
Globalization is not just a matter of material connections; it is also a matter of consciousness
(Albrow 1997). Once we understand that (for example) the American and European appetite for
palm oil leads to clear-cutting rainforests in Borneo, which in turn increases the carbon load on the
atmosphere (Rosenthal 2007), we think differently than we did before. The same happens when we
learn that donating used clothing to charities in the U.K. harms the local textile industry in Kenya,
where 75% of such donations end up (Kubania 2015). In such instances, we see that our local standpoint
misleads us. We learn that we need to see from other standpoints, if we want to see how our global
system works.
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This brings us back to the sociology of religion. Our discipline’s currently dominant theories were
created in Europe and America to understand developments in Euro-American religion. We need
to recognize their standpoint-based partiality. In our interconnected world, it seems quaint to think
that life will improve as ‘bad old authoritarian religion’ fades away or at least retreats to the private
sphere (Vásquez 2013). Equally quaint is the notion that progress comes when we free up religious
markets, as the rational-choice theorists wanted us to believe (Stark and Finke 2000). Nor is the promise
of increased religious individualism (Heelas and Woodhead 2005) a panacea, at least because such
religion erases the possibility of social critique (Spickard 2017b)—something that an interconnected,
risk-filled world sorely needs.
Each of these theories was plausible when the world was less connected and those of us living in
the Global North could imagine that others’ experiences of the world were much like our own. That is
no longer the case. Others’ experiences are not just like our own, and people in other social locations
see things that we cannot. Yet we all share the same complex world. If we are to understand that
world—the point of our science—all of us need to recognize that our visions are partial. No matter
where we stand, we are confronted with the conceptual limitations that our own social locations create
for us. Transcending those limitations is the intellectual task of our time.
Reflexive theorizing calls for us to grip this tightly. It asks us to remember our own location when
we theorize. It asks us to recognize the limits of our own vision. It asks us to remember that different
people have different amounts of power, including the financial power noted above. Yet it requires
us to reach across our divisions, so that we can learn what people with different powers, with other
identities, and from other historical-cultural locations see about our common world.
This could not have happened in a fully colonial era. Said (1978), Fanon (1963), Memmi (1967),
Geertz (1988), Trinh (1989), and others have ably shown us how colonialism made social-scientific
knowledge a tool of empire. Their post-colonial theorizing was a slap against that empire and the
social scientists whose work supported it. In effect, they said it was time for Western intellectuals to
obey the title of American Indian activist Deloria (1970) book: We Talk, You Listen. Euro-American
intellectuals have a lot of listening to do, before we understand what the world looks like from other
historical-cultural locations than our own.
Listening, however, is not the end of the road. Every location has its blind spots—including the
post-colonialists’ (Spickard 2017a, pp. 225–41). Every location lets us see some things but hides others.
There is no God’s eye view of the global world that we share. If we want to understand that world,
then we have to lean across our differences and share our insights. Sprague (2005), who understands
social-scientific epistemology as well as anyone I have encountered, writes about the strength of
standpoint theories. She tells us that all humans have standpoints, but we also have the ability to
imagine the world from other people’s standpoints. We can use these to correct our own.
5. The Ethics and Epistemologies of Reflexive Theorizing
At this point, a perfectly wise sociologist of religion would describe for you a perfectly reflexive
theory about religion’s place in the contemporary world. She would tell you what is happening to
religion and why that happening looks different, depending on where we stand.
For example: where a statistical sociologist might tie membership declines in American and
European churches to a loss of religious belief (Bruce 2002), a feminist sociologist might trace this to
changing women’s roles: increased women’s employment lowers how much they can volunteer
to sustain local congregations (Marler 2008; Day 2017), leading those congregations to decline.
A Confucian sociologist might elaborate this, noting that women’s socially assigned role in maintaining
interpersonal relationships is central to American and British religious life. Their action is the li that
generates the de that makes congregations possible (Spickard 2017a, pp. 111–34) A Khaldūnian
sociologist might take a different tack by asking where and when religion becomes a locus of
group identity, as opposed to ethnicity, class, nation, or other markers (Spickard 2017a, pp. 159–80).
A sociologist sensitive to poor people might trace the ways that their religious engagements helps
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them cope with life in a world stacked against them (Smilde 2007). Each of these would illuminate
part of the picture. Other standpoints would make other contributions.
The problem is, I am not a perfectly wise sociologist of religion. I cannot give you such a sum-it-up
picture of religion in the contemporary world.
I can, however, make some comments on the epistemological and ethical implication of the picture
I have been painting. To remind you: that picture contains three elements.
• First, we all see the world through lenses shaped by our historical-cultural situations.
• Second, each of those lenses has a partial but perspectivally accurate view.
• Third, we live in a hilly, unequal, but globalizing world, where we can, if we will, communicate
across our partial viewpoints and see our own partiality.
There are a lot of barriers to that communication, but it is at least possible. The question is,
how can we encourage that communication to improve our discipline’s understanding of the world
we share?
I need to introduce a concept here, one well-known in Kantian metaphysics and in certain varieties
of the philosophy of science. This is the notion of a “regulative ideal”. Put simply, a regulative ideal is
an abstract idea that makes practical activity possible. It does not, itself, constitute knowledge, but it
regulates thought so that a particular action ensues (Kant 1965, A180/B222)
Let’s imagine a social scientist who studies religions. Social scientists share an ideal that regulates
all their scientific activity: it is the ideal that a scientist is supposed to get things right. As scientists,
we come up with hypotheses, then we find data to test them. What are we supposed to do if the data
tell us that our hypothesis is wrong? We throw away the hypothesis and seek a better one. This is so
simple that it is in our beginning textbooks. Yet it puts us in rather deep epistemological waters.
The problem is, what count as data and proof shift from time to time and place to place, depending
on what our scientific community will accept. When I entered this profession, most sociologists of
religion would only accept numbers as data: demographics, survey research, and so on. I was told
in no uncertain terms that my ethnographic work was not sociology, no matter how rigorous my
fieldwork had been. That has changed. Sociologists of religion now see the worth of qualitative data
because it, together with numeric data, gives us a ‘better’ picture of religion than numeric data alone.
This is progress.
Yet notice the intellectual structure of this statement. ‘Progress’ means that we have absorbed
another way of seeing the world because we now agree that it produces a picture that is ‘more right’
than the picture we held before. If we did not have that ideal of ‘getting things right’, we would not be able
to speak of progress at all. Scientific progress depends on the abstract notion that we can improve our
understanding. This regulative ideal lets us improve our accounts of the world—not just individually,
but as a scientific community.
Charles Sanders Peirce put this abstractly, using the term ‘truth’ in place of the term I have used
here: ‘getting things right’. He pointed out that ‘scientific truth’ is the result of an eschatological
process. He wrote that: “Truth is that concordance of abstract statement with the ideal limit toward
which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief.”2 He saw the scientific enterprise
as a communal activity, in which scientists read and critiqued each other’s work, repeat each other’s
experiments, and gradually—collectively—come to understand the world better than they had before.
Self-critical striving for an ever-better picture of the world lets scientists say with certainty that current
views improve on the past. They can be just as certain, however, that their continued effort to get
things right will overthrow current understandings.
As sociologists, we are engaged in the same endeavor. What is required of us, if we are to improve
our understanding of religion in the contemporary world?
2 Quoted by Feibelman (1969, p. 212).
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6. What Is to Be Done?
There are, I think, three things that we must do. These are not moral judgments, or at least not
only moral judgments; they are also scientific and epistemological ones. We must do these things or
else we will be unable to improve sociology’s knowledge of our subject matter.
My first proposition is that people who are privileged must listen to the insights of those who are not.
We are long past the day when we could listen only to White, male, Euro-American, professional
class voices to tell us what is happening to religion. These voices have insights, but they do not
see the whole picture. They—and I include myself—are privileged enough to be able to forget that
their vision is partial. In our present, hilly, unequal world, they are, relatively speaking, at the center.
If we want our discipline to progress, sociologists must listen to the voices from the margins, so as
to correct our current misunderstandings. Our discipline will not make theoretical progress unless
we all communicate and combine our respective insights. Those at the center already dominate our
discipline’s communications; they do not need to work to make their voices heard. Thus, they need to
make explicit room for marginal voices. Those voices have something to contribute as well.
My second proposition is that we must analyze the socio-political situation in which both marginal voices
and central voices live.
Intellectual life does not exist in a vacuum; it is shaped by larger world events. Secularization
theory absorbed the prejudices of its day, just as rational-choice theory absorbed the politics of
neoliberalism. The same could easily happen today. Keeping a weather-eye on the dynamics of our own
era is the only way that we can track the forces shaping us. Again, this is a scientific/epistemological
issue rather than just a moral one. Ignoring such factors practically guarantees that we will get the
picture wrong.
The third proposition is a bit different. If what I have been arguing is correct, our effort to create
a scientific sociology of religion depends on free communication between people across cultural,
national, racial, ethnic, class, gender, and other divides. We need everyone’s insights if we to progress.
That requires us to defend each other’s participation in the world conversation.
My third proposition flows from this: We must protect each other’s independent intellectual inquiry.
We must do so, not just in the name of humanity, though that ought to be enough; we must do it
in the name of science. If we do not, if oppression, violence, denial of resources, or silencing makes us
lose our colleagues’ contributions, then our science suffers. Protecting free intellectual inquiry is an
epistemological matter, not just an ethical one; without it, scientific progress is impossible. This point
is at the heart of my contribution today.
Our globalized world ties us together in webs of social and economic interdependence. Our
work as scientists does so intellectually as well. World inequities threaten our conversation partners—
politically, economically, socially, and militarily. People without power are, as our late colleague
Maduro (2004, p. 232) reminded us, “consistently threatened, busted, bombed, or trampled by the
this-worldly powers and principalities”.
Maduro (2014, p. 45) also reminded us that “As intellectuals, we brandish a special kind of
power.” It matters how we use that power: “with whom, for whom, for what?” He saw this primarily
as an ethical issue, but I submit it is also a scientific and epistemological one. Only the privileged can
ignore the inequality and violence in our world. Ignoring inequality, violence, and the world’s other
ills means that we fail to see religion (and everything else) clearly from standpoints other than our
own. It makes us forget that our own views are partial ones, and we mistake the part for the whole.
We then do bad science.
Reflexive theorizing in the sociology of religion requires us to see the world as it is, and to seek
the insights of those who encounter the world through multiple historical-cultural lenses. It calls us to
be one world community.
Fortunately, there are now international scholarly organizations—the International Sociological
Association among them—dedicated to all three of these tasks. Our Research Committee for the
Sociology of Religion has fostered and will continue to foster the voices from the margins from which
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we have so much to learn. It has analyzed and will continue to analyze the socio-political situation in
which we all live. And it has defended and will continue to defend the right of sociologists everywhere
to describe our world, free from suppression, violence, and fear.
We have not done enough. There is more to do, but at least we are walking the right road.
Our science depends on our continuing to do so.
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